Gender Bias, Investments in Children, and Bequests
The impacts of pure sex preference and differential earnings opportunities by gender on investments in children are modelled with altruism. If bequest constraints do not bind human investments are privately efficient, with the higher-earning gender receiving more education. Education does not depend on parental wealth. The gender differential in bequests is ambiguous, however, even in this case. When bequest constraints bind education may depend on wealth and it is also possible for the gender with better earnings opportunities to get less education. The model is tested with data from Philippine villages where bequest constraints are generally nonbinding. The schooling differential slightly favors daughters. Estimated bequest behavior, however, reflects pure sex preference in terms of our model. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Volume (Year): 36 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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