Fiscal decentralization, tax competition, and federal tax administration: A note from the Argentine experience
The paper analyses the usual arguments discussed in the fiscal federalism literature about fiscal decentralization through normative and positive (public choice) approaches. Afterwards, limits to enhance significantly fiscal decentralization in countries with important regional asymmetries like Argentina are analyzed. Finally, the author suggests the necessity of a fiscal institutional reform, which allows an efficient and responsible vertical coordination. A superlative role is assigned to the federal revenue administration in the suggested reform.
Volume (Year): XLII (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 54 0351 4437300 int 253
Fax: 54 351 433 4436
Web page: http://ief.eco.unc.edu.ar/Email:
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ief:reveye:v:42:y:2004:i:2:p:7-28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marcelo Coser)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.