Logistics service supply chain coordination mechanism: a perspective of customer experience level

Continuously improving the customer experience level (CEL) becomes a consensus among companies and has a profound impact on the coordination of logistics service supply chain (LSSC), but it has been ignored by existing research. By establishing Stackelberg game models, we investigate the coordination mechanism of LSSC from the perspective of CEL, and obtain many unexpected findings. First, LSSC cannot be coordinated in a benchmark. Secondly, the role of buyback contract or quality supervision in coordinating the supply chain is limited. However, perfect coordination of LSSC can be achieved if quality supervision and buyback contracts are adopted simultaneously. Finally, when there is no condition to implement quality supervision, we propose an alternative mechanism. In summary, we prove the limitations of the buyback contract and quality supervision in the coordination supply chain through modelling, and creatively propose two feasible LSSC coordination mechanisms to make up for the existing research gaps. [Submitted: 29 August 2019; Accepted: 5 June 2020]