Corporate governance and earnings management: evidence from Iran
This paper examines the relationship between board characteristics and earnings management in Iranian firms. The results show that when the CEO is the board chair and if the board size grows, the level of earnings management would increase. However, when there are more non-executive and institutional directors on the board, the level of earnings management will be lower. Even holding more board meetings does not decrease the extent of earnings management and the presence of an audit committee does not have any significant influence on earnings management.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 1 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalID=214|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ids:afasfa:v:1:y:2008:i:2:p:180-198. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Graham Langley)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.