Corporate governance and earnings management: evidence from Iran
This paper examines the relationship between board characteristics and earnings management in Iranian firms. The results show that when the CEO is the board chair and if the board size grows, the level of earnings management would increase. However, when there are more non-executive and institutional directors on the board, the level of earnings management will be lower. Even holding more board meetings does not decrease the extent of earnings management and the presence of an audit committee does not have any significant influence on earnings management.
Volume (Year): 1 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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