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The Creation of Heroes and Villains as a Problem in the History of Economics

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  • Robert W. Dimand

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  • Robert W. Dimand, 2007. "The Creation of Heroes and Villains as a Problem in the History of Economics," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 39(5), pages 76-95, Supplemen.
  • Handle: RePEc:hop:hopeec:v:39:y:2007:i:5:p:76-95
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 97-109.
    2. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
    3. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    4. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, December.
    5. Nicola Giocoli, 2004. "Nash Equilibrium," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, pages 639-666.
    6. Robert J. Leonard, 1992. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash / or / The Emergence and Stabilization of the Nash equilibrium," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9214, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    7. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 291-303.
    8. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 109-112.
    9. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    10. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 187-194.
    11. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
    12. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 316-322.
    13. Myerson, Roger, 2001. "Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 20-25, July.
    14. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225 Elsevier.
    15. M. Shubik & K. Okuguchi & K. Borchardt & F. Schneider, 1990. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, pages 207-218.
    16. John C. Harsanyi, 1962. "Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), pages 29-38.
    17. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225 Elsevier.
    18. John C. Harsanyi, 1962. "Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), pages 29-38.
    19. Leonard, Robert J, 1994. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(424), pages 492-511, May.
    20. anonymous, 1961. "Book Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 445-454.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lise Arena, 2013. "Book Review -Peter Groenewegen, The Minor Marshallians and Alfred Marshall: An Evaluation," Post-Print halshs-00864473, HAL.

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