Non Constant Sum and R+S Player Extensions of the Linear Programming Representation of Two Person Constant Sum Games
This paper has two purposes. The first is to present theorems and results which show how the minimax and duality results familiar in the context of two person constant sum games can usefully be extended to include: i) resource constraints; ii) prior information concerning an opponentÆs potential choice of strategies; iii) explicit modelling of the play: do not play decision and; iv) ideas of strategic equivalence and of intervening duality which extend the linear programming approach to nonconstant sum and explicitly bargaining related cases. The second purpose of the paper is to extend all of these results further to include cases in which there are cooperating players on the primal side and cooperating opponents on the dual side. Throughout the paper ideas and results will be illustrated by using farmer and landowner and weather related examples.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 23 (2005)
Issue (Month): ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg|
Phone: 49 40 42838-4457
Fax: 49 40 42838-6329
Web page: http://www.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereiche-einrichtungen/fb03/ise/index.html
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:23:y:2005:p:401-424. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.