Quota Solutions beyond Quota Games: a Comment on Antov and Packel
Antov and Packel introduce the coordinated solution for superadditive games in which looking at coalitions of size is sufficient to establish the emptiness of the core. I argue that this solution is only appropriate if coalitions of size are fully responsible for the core being empty. I also argue that the solution is based on a very solid idea, insufficiently pursued so far: the payoff divison for the grand coalition should depend only on the ôdisagreement outcomesö, that is, on the coalitions and payoffs that arise if full cooperation breaks down. In this line, I discuss the possibility of extending the solution to games in which coalitions of an arbitrary size k are fully responsible for the emptiness of the core.
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Volume (Year): 20 (2004)
Issue (Month): ()
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