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Imperfect Monitoring in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma - A Strategy Tornament

Listed author(s):
  • Anita Ganter

    (University of California, Santa Barbara, USA)

  • Manfred K÷nigstein

    (Humboldt-University, Berlin, Institute for Economic Theory III)

Registered author(s):

    Whether Individuals can build up and sustain mutually beneficial cooperation or, more generally, whether they comply with social norms, may depend crucially on the observability of their actions. If these cannot be monitored perfectly, the individual might be tempted to egoistically exploit this situation, or might reduce its cooperativeness because it anticipates exploitative attempts by others. In two strategy tournaments on the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with imperfect monitoring we systematically varied the degree of observability. We collected "spontaneous strategies" and investigated which types of strategies were successful in each tournament, and whether a higher monitoring level increases or reduces cooperation.

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    Article provided by Institute of SocioEconomics in its journal Homo Oeconomicus.

    Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
    Issue (Month): ()
    Pages: 31-46

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    Handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:31-46
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