An Investigation Into Multiparty Emergency Cooperation Tactics Within the Digital Technology Infrastructure Engineering Supply Chain Under Regulatory Incentives

To enhance the emergency response capacity of the digital technology infrastructure engineering supply chain and reduce the independent costs and risks faced by enterprises during emergency situations, this paper constructs a game model involving key stakeholders: regulatory agencies, resource suppliers, and service operators. It analyzes the relationships among emergency response capacity, regulatory subsidy rate, and emergency benefits. The findings show that a collaborative cooperation mechanism can significantly improve the supply chain’s emergency response capacity. In the process of enhancing emergency capabilities, reducing emergency costs should be the top priority, followed by improving the efficiency of emergency data utilization. Further analysis reveals a negative correlation between the proportion of corporate income distribution and the improvement of emergency capacity. When the distribution ratio reaches two-thirds, the regulatory subsidy rate in noncooperative games no longer affects the improvement of emergency capacity. The optimal subsidy rate is jointly influenced by the proportion of emergency benefits and the income distribution structure. Under the Stackelberg leader–follower game model, the optimal subsidy rate by the regulatory agency is the same for both enterprises.