IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/hin/jnddns/5796428.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System

Author

Listed:
  • Feng Cao
  • Ling Zhang
  • Yihan Wu
  • Juan L. G. Guirao

Abstract

Although the ability to manage public health emergencies in China has improved significantly, there are still many challenges to the existing information transmission mechanism in pandemic early warning systems. In this context, a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of the local government, the whistleblower, and the public is formulated. By using Matlab, the dynamic evolution path of the game model is stimulated under different conditions. Stable strategies for an early warning system for public health emergencies are also explored. The results indicate that the cost of whistleblowing, the cost of response, and the benefit of attention significantly influence strategic decisions among three parties. This study highlights the importance of whistleblowing in managing public health emergencies. Yet, our findings provide theoretical support for policy recommendations for promoting public health emergency preparedness.

Suggested Citation

  • Feng Cao & Ling Zhang & Yihan Wu & Juan L. G. Guirao, 2022. "The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System," Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, Hindawi, vol. 2022, pages 1-13, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:hin:jnddns:5796428
    DOI: 10.1155/2022/5796428
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/ddns/2022/5796428.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/ddns/2022/5796428.xml
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1155/2022/5796428?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hin:jnddns:5796428. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mohamed Abdelhakeem (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.hindawi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.