Coevolutionary Institutional Design for the Transition From Government to Market Guarantees in Intellectual Property Securitization

Intellectual property (IP) securitization constitutes a complex and emerging financial ecosystem that connects innovation-driven firms, investors, and risk-bearing institutions. Its evolution is shaped by nonlinear feedbacks between institutional design, asset credibility, and market confidence. This study develops an agent-based simulation model to examine how the withdrawal pace of government guarantees and the entry timing of market-based guarantors jointly drive the dynamic transition of the IP securitization market. The model captures adaptive interactions among heterogeneous agents including governments, guarantors, firms, and investors under varying transition scenarios. Results show that gradual government withdrawal, synchronized with moderate to rapid market guarantor entry, generates stable market growth and effective risk containment. In contrast, premature withdrawal without sufficient institutional substitutes amplifies systemic risk, undermines investor participation, and stalls market expansion. Persistent government guarantees can stabilize early markets but may inhibit the endogenous emergence of market-based risk pricing. The analysis also investigates the role of collateral requirements, showing that strict pledge standards constrain downside risk yet are less effective than external guarantees when high-risk participants bypass collateralization. Loosening pledge rules enhances financing access but can degrade product quality if not supported by mature institutional safeguards. These findings highlight the importance of policy sequencing, adaptive risk controls, and coevolutionary design in fostering a resilient and self-sustaining IP securitization system.