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Civil conflict & its quasi criminal status: some new insights


  • Partha Gangopadhyay


This paper develops a game-theoretic framework to examine civil conflict arising from predation. From activities of predation, or appropriation, and protection we highlight the optimal choices of a benevolent dictator, or government, at the core and a self-seeking rebel group at the periphery in terms of their arms spending, or scales of militancy, when the dictator has already pre-committed the transfers, or gifts, to the periphery. In the Cournot–Nash equilibrium of the proposed game, we make three important contributions to the literature: First, we explain some of the causes of civil conflict hitherto unknown in the literature. Secondly, we are also able to isolate the factors that are responsible for mitigating civil conflict. Finally, we highlight the process of peace-making as a Pareto-improving investment in allocating resources in the context of core-periphery interrelationships.

Suggested Citation

  • Partha Gangopadhyay, 2012. "Civil conflict & its quasi criminal status: some new insights," International Journal of Development and Conflict, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, vol. 2(2), pages 1250010-125.
  • Handle: RePEc:gok:ijdcv1:v:2:y:2012:i:2:p:1250010

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