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Locking and Breaking Through the Green Transformation of Agriculture from the Perspective of Social Co-Governance: An Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Government–Farmer–Public Trichotomy

Author

Listed:
  • Mailiwei Dilixiati

    (School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China)

  • Yiqi Dong

    (School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China)

  • Saihong Wang

    (Department of Geography, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China)

  • Zuoji Dong

    (School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China)

Abstract

During the critical period of agricultural green transformation, clarifying the evolutionary logic of farmers’ green production behavior under a multi-stakeholder framework provides significant insights for implementing “Dual Carbon” goals, establishing long-term mechanisms for high-quality agricultural development, and resolving deep-seated contradictions in agricultural non-point source pollution. Based on the social co-governance and public participation framework, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving government departments, farmer groups, and the general public, grounded in cost–benefit analysis, social governance friction, and evolutionary game theory. Through simulation, the study explores the equilibrium states and the specific impacts of varying parameter values on stable points. The findings reveal that: (1) The “interest price scissors” (benefit disparity) between green and conventional production is the key determinant of farmers’ strategic equilibrium. Once this structural contradiction is resolved, green production becomes the optimal strategy. (2) Farmers are highly sensitive to marginal cost–benefit fluctuations, leading to a sequential behavioral cascade: farmers retreat first, followed by the government, and finally the public. (3) Public participation cost is the pivotal variable for activating the co-governance mechanism, and the application of digital governance tools determines the time required to reach equilibrium. (4) A “Success Paradox” exists in government regulation; incentive mechanisms must be adjusted promptly after initial success. (5) Integrated policy combinations outperform single instruments; breaking the “locked-in” state requires a policy shock of sufficient intensity. This research offers a theoretical basis and policy enlightenment for optimizing the social co-governance landscape and promoting sustainable agricultural modernization.

Suggested Citation

  • Mailiwei Dilixiati & Yiqi Dong & Saihong Wang & Zuoji Dong, 2026. "Locking and Breaking Through the Green Transformation of Agriculture from the Perspective of Social Co-Governance: An Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Government–Farmer–Public Trichotomy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 18(8), pages 1-33, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:18:y:2026:i:8:p:4095-:d:1924367
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