Multi-Source Environmental Data Sharing in Green Innovation Networks: A Network Evolutionary Game Approach

Multi-source environmental data are increasingly used for measurement, reporting and verification, and for coordinating low-carbon innovation across interorganizational networks. However, voluntary data sharing remains limited because participants face asymmetric costs, leakage and compliance risks, and uncertainty in value capture. This study develops a network evolutionary game model to examine how cooperative data sharing emerges and stabilizes in green innovation networks. We specify a two-strategy game in which heterogeneous agents choose between sharing and withholding. The payoff structure integrates private innovation gains from their own data, cross-partner synergy, external incentives, fixed governance costs, and stock-scaled sharing and risk burdens. Agents interact on a Barabási–Albert scale-free network and update strategies via local imitation under a Fermi rule. Simulations show that cooperation can diffuse from low initial participation and converge to a high-sharing regime when benefit allocation and incentive intensity jointly offset cost and risk frictions. Several governance levers exhibit threshold-type effects, including the allocation share, the opportunity loss of non-sharing, and the marginal cost–risk burden. Multi-source synergy and subsidies further raise the attainable cooperation level, but with diminishing marginal returns. Degree heterogeneity accelerates diffusion once hub organizations adopt sharing, while also raising fairness concerns when benefits concentrate on central nodes. Overall, the findings provide green-innovation-specific governance conditions that translate threshold regions into implementable design targets for sustainable environmental data sharing.