Interdepartmental Cooperation Mechanisms in Urban Flood Emergency Management: An Information-Consistency Perspective

Urban flooding poses significant challenges to urban safety and resilience, and effective cooperation between emergency management agencies and functional departments is crucial for successful emergency responses. This study constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the cooperative behavior of municipal emergency management authorities and supporting departments in response to urban flooding, focusing on the impact of information consistency. The model explores various scenarios to assess how changes in key parameters affect the evolution of cooperation strategies. Results reveal that information consistency fundamentally influences the equilibrium of interdepartmental cooperation, with collaborative payoffs and losses linked to information inconsistency driving the shift from low-quality to high-quality cooperation. The study also finds that increasing free-riding payoffs destabilizes cooperation, while strengthening penalties and enforcement improves the sustainability of high-quality cooperation. Based on these findings, the paper suggests enhancing information consistency through an integrated emergency information system, refining incentive mechanisms, and reinforcing supervision and accountability to strengthen interdepartmental collaboration and improve disaster management efficiency.