Intergovernmental Cooperation in Zero-Waste City Development in China: An Evolutionary Game Analysis Under Prospect Theory

Amid mounting environmental pressures and tightening resource constraints in China’s cities, advancing zero-waste city initiatives has become a critical avenue for sustainable urban governance. Zero-waste cities not only improve environmental quality but also enhance resource recycling and foster innovative urban governance models. This study develops an evolutionary game model that incorporates prospect theory to examine the strategic interactions between provincial and local governments. The results show that: (1) each side’s subjective perception of gains and losses significantly shapes its willingness to cooperate; (2) incentives and penalties exert asymmetric effects over the course of policy evolution: subsidies matter most during initiation, penalties are pivotal for overcoming resistance in the transition phase, and non-material incentives become increasingly important as the governance system matures; (3) zero-waste city development follows a three-stage evolutionary trajectory, moving from pilot programs to self-sustaining local governance. Using numerical simulations, this research further assesses how key parameters affect the strategic choices of both levels of government, generating policy-relevant insights for municipal solid waste management and intergovernmental cooperation in zero-waste city governance.