Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low-Carbon Transition in the Steel Industry Under Demand-Side Constraints: A Simulation Based on Empirical Data

Under the constraints of China’s “Dual Carbon” targets, promoting green consumption has emerged as a critical market-based strategy to drive industrial decarbonization and achieve sustainable development. However, the existing literature primarily focuses on supply-side government regulation, leaving the mechanism of how demand-side constraints influence the strategic interaction between the government and enterprises under-explored. To bridge this gap, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model incorporating performance-based government incentives, consumer low-carbon preferences, and corporate abatement costs. Unlike theoretical models with hypothetical parameters, this study calibrates the simulation parameters using empirical data from the steel industry in Zhejiang Province, a pilot zone for China’s ecological civilization construction. The simulation results indicate that: First, under the current empirical parameters, the system fails to spontaneously converge to the ideal equilibrium state, highlighting a “governance deadlock”; second, consumer preference intensity serves as a vital external force that can effectively break this deadlock and reduce the government’s regulatory burden; and finally, sensitivity analysis reveals the critical thresholds for the synergistic effect between regulatory policies and market demand. Based on these findings, policy recommendations are proposed to foster a collaborative governance mechanism integrating government guidance, market-driven approaches, and demand-side driving forces.