Optimal Incentive Strategy of Technology Information Sharing in Power Battery Recycling Supply Chain

With the rapid development of the new energy vehicle industry, the efficiency of information sharing in the power battery recycling supply chain greatly affects resource utilization and sustainability. This paper examines battery manufacturers and third-party recyclers as game participants. We analyze incentive mechanisms for sharing technical information, considering both information quality and leakage risks. This study constructs three types of Stackelberg game models: contract mechanisms, profit-sharing mechanisms, and cost-sharing mechanisms. We analyze the impact of technical information quality and leakage costs on supply chain decisions. Results show that manufacturer profits increase with growing leakage costs, following optimal transitions through profit-sharing, contract, and cost-sharing mechanisms. Recycler profits are influenced by both the quality of technical information and leakage costs. Overall supply chain profits trend toward cost-sharing mechanisms when technical information quality is low and favor profit-sharing mechanisms when quality is high. Under low leakage risk, cost-sharing mechanisms dominate at the technological level and in terms of recycling quantity. Under high leakage risk, profit-sharing mechanisms share leakage costs and lead in technology investment and recycling quantity. Contract mechanisms consistently have the lowest levels and volumes because they lack cost sharing and profit compensation. This study provides a theoretical foundation and practical guidance for information-sharing strategies in power battery recycling supply chains.