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Research on Optimization of Array Honeypot Defense Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Author

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  • Leyi Shi

    (College of Oceanography and Space Informatics, China University of Petroleum, Qingdao 266580, China
    College of Computer Science and Technology, China University of Petroleum, Qingdao 266580, China
    Guangxi Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security, Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin 541004, China
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Xiran Wang

    (College of Oceanography and Space Informatics, China University of Petroleum, Qingdao 266580, China
    College of Computer Science and Technology, China University of Petroleum, Qingdao 266580, China
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Huiwen Hou

    (College of Computer Science and Technology, China University of Petroleum, Qingdao 266580, China)

Abstract

Honeypot has been regarded as an active defense technology that can deceive attackers by simulating real systems. However, honeypot is actually a static network trap with fixed disposition, which is easily identified by anti-honeypot technology. Thus, honeypot is a “passive” active defense technology. Dynamic honeypot makes up for the shortcomings of honeypot, which dynamically adjusts defense strategies with the attack of hackers. Therefore, the confrontation between defenders and attackers is a strategic game. This paper focuses on the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism of bounded rationality, aiming to improve the security of the array honeypot system through the evolutionarily stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model of array honeypot, which is composed of defenders, attackers and legitimate users. Secondly, we formally describe the strategies and revenues of players in the game, and build the three-party game payoff matrices. Then the evolutionarily stable strategy is obtained by analyzing the Replicator Dynamics of various parties. In addition, we discuss the equilibrium condition to get the influence of the number of servers N on the stability of strategy evolution. MATLAB and Gambit simulation experiment results show that deduced evolutionarily stable strategies are valid in resisting attackers.

Suggested Citation

  • Leyi Shi & Xiran Wang & Huiwen Hou, 2021. "Research on Optimization of Array Honeypot Defense Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(8), pages 1-21, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:9:y:2021:i:8:p:805-:d:531964
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    Cited by:

    1. Qiyun Huang & Junwu Wang & Mengwei Ye & Shiman Zhao & Xiang Si, 2022. "A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-22, February.
    2. Ruzhi Xu & Tingting Guo & Huawei Zhao, 2022. "Research on the Path of Policy Financing Guarantee to Promote SMEs’ Green Technology Innovation," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-24, February.

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