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Quantum Chosen-Cipher Attack on Camellia

Author

Listed:
  • Yanjun Li

    (Infomation Industry lnformation Security Evaluation Center, The 15th Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Beijing 100083, China)

  • Qi Wang

    (Department of Cryptography Science and Technology, Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute, Beijing 100070, China)

  • Dingyun Huang

    (Department of Cryptography Science and Technology, Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute, Beijing 100070, China)

  • Jian Liu

    (Infomation Industry lnformation Security Evaluation Center, The 15th Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Beijing 100083, China)

  • Huiqin Xie

    (Department of Cryptography Science and Technology, Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute, Beijing 100070, China)

Abstract

The Feistel structure represents a fundamental architectural component within the domain of symmetric cryptographic algorithms, with a substantial body of research conducted within the context of classical computing environments. Nevertheless, research into specific symmetric cryptographic algorithms utilizing the Feistel structure is relatively scarce in quantum computing environments. This paper, for the first time, proposes a five-round distinguisher for Camellia under the quantum chosen-ciphertext attack (qCCA) setting, with its effectiveness empirically validated. Additionally, by combining Grover’s algorithm and Simon’s algorithm, we construct a nine-round key-recovery attack model against Camellia. Through an in-depth analysis of Camellia’s key expansion algorithm, we significantly reduce the complexity of the key-recovery attack. The proposed attack achieves a time complexity of 2 61.5 for recovering the correct key bits and requires 531 quantum bits.

Suggested Citation

  • Yanjun Li & Qi Wang & Dingyun Huang & Jian Liu & Huiqin Xie, 2025. "Quantum Chosen-Cipher Attack on Camellia," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-18, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:13:y:2025:i:9:p:1383-:d:1641148
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