Evolutionary Game Analysis of Emergency Grain Storage Regulatory Mechanisms Under Government Digital Governance

Grain storage is one of the important means of national macro-control, significantly impacting people’s livelihood and social stability. In emergencies, grain storage enhances disaster relief efficiency and victim resettlement. Currently, developing countries primarily use government storage and government–enterprise joint storage. In response to the speculative behavior caused by the profit-seeking tendencies of agent storage enterprises in the process of joint government–enterprise grain storage, this study considers the current status of digital governance reform by the government and takes the government–enterprise emergency joint grain storage mechanism as its research object. We construct an evolutionary game model between the government and agent storage enterprises, analyze the evolutionary stability of the strategy choices of the two parties, explore the impact of various factors on the strategy choices of both parties, and discuss different stable strategy combinations. Through simulation analysis of the cost–benefit systems of both sides, initial strategy probabilities, key factor sensitivity, and the impact of digital governance levels, we propose a number of management recommendations that can effectively reduce speculative behavior and provide guidance for the government to improve its emergency grain storage system.