IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jmathe/v10y2022i19p3685-d936559.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Member Tampering Attack on Burmester-Desmedt Group Key Exchange Protocol and Its Countermeasure

Author

Listed:
  • Da-Zhi Sun

    (Tianjin Key Laboratory of Advanced Networking (TANK), College of Intelligence and Computing, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300350, China)

  • Yangguang Tian

    (Department of Computer Science, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, Surrey, UK)

Abstract

With the rapid development of cloud computing and mobile networks, more and more application scenarios require a secret group key for secure communication. Group Key Exchange (GKE) protocol provides a secret group key for three or more members. Burmester and Desmedt presented an influential GKE protocol, which has a broadcast version and a cyclic version. In this paper, we investigate the security weaknesses of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We report that both the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol suffer member tampering attacks if the two members that belong to both group A and group B are corrupted. That is, two corrupted members can add some unknowing members of group A to group B and trick the legal members of group B to believe that these unknowing members share the secret group key with them after a protocol run. Furthermore, to defeat the member tampering attack, we propose digital signature-based improvements on the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We hope our research results will encourage the development of more robust and effective GKE protocols that stand rigorous security analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Da-Zhi Sun & Yangguang Tian, 2022. "Member Tampering Attack on Burmester-Desmedt Group Key Exchange Protocol and Its Countermeasure," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(19), pages 1-18, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:10:y:2022:i:19:p:3685-:d:936559
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/10/19/3685/pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/10/19/3685/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:10:y:2022:i:19:p:3685-:d:936559. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.