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Inefficient Learning Leads to Efficient Coordination: A Repeated Stag-Hunt Game with Learning Agents

Author

Listed:
  • Ren Manfredi

    (IMT School for Advanced Studies, 55100 Lucca, Italy)

  • Daniele Vilone

    (Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC), National Research Council, 00196 Rome, Italy
    Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Spain)

  • Tijan J. Cvetkovic

    (Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC), National Research Council, 00196 Rome, Italy
    Centro Studi Dinamiche Complesse (CSDC), University of Florence, 50019 Sesto Fiorentino, Italy)

  • Franco Bagnoli

    (Centro Studi Dinamiche Complesse (CSDC), University of Florence, 50019 Sesto Fiorentino, Italy
    Deptartment of Physics and Astronomy, University of Florence, 50019 Sesto Fiorentino, Italy)

  • Andrea Guazzini

    (Centro Studi Dinamiche Complesse (CSDC), University of Florence, 50019 Sesto Fiorentino, Italy
    Department of Education, Literatures, Intercultural Studies, Languages and Psychology, University of Florence, 50129 Florence, Italy)

Abstract

In coordination games, the distinctive presence of multiple equilibria poses a challenge to coordination, and this has led over time to the proposal of numerous determinants of the latter. In this paper, we study coordination in a repeated Stag-hunt game played by two agents who are able to learn from the outcomes of each game, but do not know the payoff matrix. By modulating their learning capabilities, we show that agents are able to coordinate on the social optimum when they learn slowly from experience and are prone to making mistakes. A comparison with the results from a recent laboratory experiment is also provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Ren Manfredi & Daniele Vilone & Tijan J. Cvetkovic & Franco Bagnoli & Andrea Guazzini, 2026. "Inefficient Learning Leads to Efficient Coordination: A Repeated Stag-Hunt Game with Learning Agents," Games, MDPI, vol. 17(4), pages 1-18, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:17:y:2026:i:4:p:39-:d:1998147
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