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All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits

Author

Listed:
  • Benjamin Kang

    (MIT PRIMES, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA)

  • James Unwin

    (Department of Physics, University of Illinois Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607, USA
    Department of Physics, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
    Theoretical Physics Group, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
    Mathematics Sciences Research Institute, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA)

Abstract

In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all-pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here, we consider a number of alternative forfeits that might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Kang & James Unwin, 2026. "All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits," Games, MDPI, vol. 17(1), pages 1-14, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:17:y:2026:i:1:p:2-:d:1837357
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