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Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments—Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning

Author

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  • Jobst Heitzig

    (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, P.O. Box 60 12 03, 14412 Potsdam, Germany)

Abstract

We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player’s contribution on the contributions of others. We prove that the set of strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincides exactly with the core of the underlying cooperative game. We further show that these core outcomes can be found via simple individual learning dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Jobst Heitzig, 2025. "Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments—Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning," Games, MDPI, vol. 16(6), pages 1-22, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:16:y:2025:i:6:p:58-:d:1788276
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