Open Market Stock Repurchase Signaling
This paper presents a signaling model of open market repurchases that simulates the effects of a repurchase on the insiders' utility. If insiders refrain from tendering, then they are exposed to more risk. If insiders are risk averse, then the market can draw several inferences regarding the insiders' expectations of their firm's future earnings: 1) firms that repurchase more have higher earnings; 2) holding the repurchase proportion constant, riskier firms have higher earnings; and 3) holding proportion constant, firms where insiders have a greater ownership stake have higher earnings. I test the model's implications with a sample of over 700 US repurchases and find support for all three.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 28 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.fma.org/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:mcnally99. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Courtney Connors)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.