The Information Effects of Analyst Activity as the Announcement of New Equity Issues
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that informational asymmetry between managers and investors can explain the negative stock returns around the announcement of new equity. Using analyst following and consensus as proxies for information asymmetry, we observe that announcement period returns are significantly more negative for firms followed by fewer analysts and whose forecasts exhibit less consensus. Our findings hold after controlling for firm size and growth opportunities. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that analyst activity also influences firms’ long-term performance. We conclude that the information role of security analysts partially explains the negative stock returns surrounding the announcement of new equity.
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Volume (Year): 29 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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