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True confessions: should banks be required to disclose more?


  • Mitchell Berlin


Mitchell Berlin examines disclosure requirements for banks. Can market participants play a significant role in ensuring that banks limit their risk-taking? Although regulators find this idea increasingly attractive, economists generally have two schools of thought: Such monitoring could substitute for regulatory discipline to a significant extent or the roles of regulators and market participants could be complementary. But to evaluate banks' risk-taking, investors would want good information about a bank's activities and balance sheet. In light of this, would more disclosure by banks be a good thing? While there are no definitive answers to this question, in "True Confessions: Should Banks Be Required to Disclose More?" Berlin reviews some recent economic literature that can offer useful insights to policymakers.

Suggested Citation

  • Mitchell Berlin, 2004. "True confessions: should banks be required to disclose more?," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q4, pages 7-15.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpbr:y:2004:i:q4:p:7-15

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    Cited by:

    1. Bischof, Jannis & Wüstemann, Jens, 2007. "How does fair value measurement under IAS 39 affect disclosure choices of European banks?," Papers 07-75, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    2. Bischof, Jannis & Wüstemann, Jens, 2007. "How Does Fair Value Measurement under IAS 39 Affect Disclosure Choices of European Banks?," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-75, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.

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