Optimal monetary policy design: rules versus discretion again
Should monetary authorities rely primarily on rules or their own discretion in conducting monetary policy? The debate has recently been revived by researchers who claim that discretionary monetary policy tempts policy makers to exploit a short-run trade-off between output and inflation and thereby leads to higher inflation expectations. This article evaluates the arguments advanced in support of these views and tests them against the empirical evidence.
Volume (Year): (1990)
Issue (Month): Win ()
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