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Commentary on "Rebalancing the three pillars of Basel II."


  • Darryll Hendricks


This paper was part of the conference "Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms," cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School, October 2-3, 2003.

Suggested Citation

  • Darryll Hendricks, 2004. "Commentary on "Rebalancing the three pillars of Basel II."," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 23-26.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednep:y:2004:i:sep:p:23-26:n:v.10no.2

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 2005. "Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1144-1166, September.
    2. Stephen D. Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q III, pages 24-36.
    3. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
    4. Stephen D. Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Working Papers 9507, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    5. Billett, Matthew T. & Garfinkel, Jon A. & O'Neal, Edward S., 1998. "The cost of market versus regulatory discipline in banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 333-358, June.
    6. Kane, Edward J, 1990. " Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 755-764, July.
    7. Kroszner, Randall S & Strahan, Philip E, 1996. " Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift Crisis: Dividends, Mutual-to-Stock Conversions, and Financial Distress," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1285-1319, September.
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    Bank supervision ; Bank capital ; Banking law;


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