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Evidências sobre as Estruturas de Propriedade de Capital e de Voto das Empresas de Capital Aberto no Brasil


  • Aldrighi, Dante Mendes
  • Neto, Roberto Mazzer


This paper focuses on the ownership and voting structures of limited liability companies in Brazil over the period 1997-2002. Its main contribution lies in measuring the magnitude of deviations between control rights and cash-flow rights for the ultimate shareholder with the largest voting rights. Furthermore, it pinpoints how these discrepancies are generated, evaluating the relative importance of the issuance of preferred stocks with no voting rights, voting agreements, pyramidal arrangements of ownership, and cross-shareholdings. The data set embraces 4,478 reports that companies, complying with a mandatory requirement, filed to the CVM over that period.

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  • Aldrighi, Dante Mendes & Neto, Roberto Mazzer, 2007. "Evidências sobre as Estruturas de Propriedade de Capital e de Voto das Empresas de Capital Aberto no Brasil," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, FGV EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 61(2), November.
  • Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:61:y:2007:i:2:a:1049

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    Cited by:

    1. Bortolon, Patrícia M. & Câmara Leal, Ricardo P., 2014. "Dual-class unifications and corporate governance in Brazil," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 89-108.
    2. Patricia Maria Bortolon & Annor da Silva Junior, 2015. "Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, vol. 0(2), pages 92-117, August.
    3. Dante Mendes Aldrighi, 2011. "Risks of Wrongdoing in Public Companies and Ways to Cope with Them: The Case of Brazil," Chapters,in: International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 8 Edward Elgar Publishing.

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