IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Decision Making on Excessive Deficits in the EMU


  • František Turnovec


The paper analyses changes in European Union decision making that reflects the new philosophy of flexible integration approved by the 1997 Amsterdam summit. It focuses on the EMU protocol on excessive deficit procedure in the Council of Ministers and formulates a new model for a priori estimates of the influence of member states in the two-stage procedure concerning the identification of excessive deficit and the imposition of sanctions. On the basis of this model the paper estimates the a priori voting power indices of EU member states in decision making vis-a-vis the EMU, depicting the ability of different member states to avoid sanction in the event of excessive deficit.

Suggested Citation

  • František Turnovec, 2000. "Decision Making on Excessive Deficits in the EMU," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 50(6), pages 348-360, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:50:y:2000:i:6:p:348-360

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    excessive budget deficit; fiscal coordination; flexible integration; monetary union; power indices;

    JEL classification:

    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:50:y:2000:i:6:p:348-360. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lenka Herrmannova). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.