IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Corporate governance e sistema fiscale: discriminazione tra azionisti

Listed author(s):
  • Angelo Castaldo
  • Gianpaolo Crudo
Registered author(s):

    Corporate Governance and Tax System: Interest Divergence between Insider-Outsider and Risk - This paper studies the interest diversion that arises, between insider and outsider in the corporation governance, when taking into account the effects determined by tax system. Very similar statutory tax rates, in presence of investment risk, reinforce the positional advantage of insider with respect to outsider. The interaction between corporate governance and tax system has been underestimated by neoclassical economic approach, and recently studied by law and economics’ scholars. On the basis of King and Fullerton’s (1984) model, we have developed a microsimulation model, considering specifically Italian tax system regime. We have then calculated effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) both in presence and in absence of risk. The main results show that at the increase of risk, effective marginal tax rates also decrease, but the reduction is more consistent for insiders. As a result, tax discrimination that arises on shareholders further amplifies the divergence of interest between insider and outsider.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Single articles can be downloaded buying download credits, for info:

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by FrancoAngeli Editore in its journal STUDI ECONOMICI.

    Volume (Year): LXIV (2009)
    Issue (Month): 98 ()
    Pages: 23-57

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/ste2009-098002
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Web: Email:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/ste2009-098002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Angelo Ventriglia)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.