Fornitura pubblica di beni privati e teoria della tassazione ottimale
Fornitura pubblica di beni privati e teoria della tassazione ottimale (di Sergio Beraldo) - ABSTRACT: Starting from the seminal contribution of Guesnerie-Roberts (1984), a recent strand of eco-nomic literature has emphasized that the use of quantitative restrictions (rationing, forced con-sumption) may be welfare enhancing in distorted (second-best) economies, where asymmetric information prevents governments from using lump-sum taxation. The present paper provides a detailed survey of this strand of economic literature, focusing, in particular, on the use of quan-titative restrictions to weaken the self-selection constraint which limits the choice of an income tax schedule, and it then discusses what this strand of economic literature has to say with regard to the opportunity for the public provision of goods and workfare.
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Volume (Year): 2003/79 (2003)
Issue (Month): 79 ()
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