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Rechtseconomische analyse van de handhavingsnood in het milieubeleid

Author

Listed:
  • S. Rousseau
  • C.M. Billiet

Abstract

This interdisciplinary analysis focuses on a simple law & economics model of environmental law enforcement. We investigate why certain firms violate environmental regulations in two problem settings (binary and continuous) and which factors determine their compliance decision. The basic model shows that the costs and benefits of enforcement have to be considered jointly and that the total net benefits from enforcing environmental policies are maximal if the marginal cost of enforcement equals its marginal benefit. It is important to clearly show to a broad audience that optimal enforcement does not have to imply maximal enforcement. Even though this insight is quite easily to convey in a theoretical framework by using a simple model, it is much harder to calculate optimal enforcement in real life applications. However, by considering some simple recommendations, the legislator can make a substantial difference to the enforcement policy and significantly improve its cost effectiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Rousseau & C.M. Billiet, 2008. "Rechtseconomische analyse van de handhavingsnood in het milieubeleid," Review of Business and Economic Literature, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Review of Business and Economic Literature, vol. 0(2), pages 188-217.
  • Handle: RePEc:ete:revbec:20080205
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