IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Trade policy and integration among firms producing complementary products

Listed author(s):
  • Leonardo Medrano

    (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica)

Registered author(s):

    This paper studies the effects on insurance premiums and consumer welfare when commissions to insurance agencies exist and are used strategically to sell insurance policies. The opportunistic behavior of agency insurers that sell the policy paying the highest commission is considered. Different market structures are considered, namely: a duopoly of insurers that compete in commissions (insurer competition), collusion among insurers with agency insurers remaining independent (horizontal collusion or insurer monopoly) and collusion between insurers and agency insurers (vertical integration or exclusive agents). We find that insurer competition and vertical integration trigger higher premiums than horizontal collusion with independent agencies. Furthermore, we argue that the optimal commission from the consumer viewpoint may be greater than the commission offered under any of the above three market structures.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos in its journal Estudios Económicos.

    Volume (Year): 16 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 133-155

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:16:y:2001:i:1:p:133-155
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:16:y:2001:i:1:p:133-155. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rocío Contreras)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.