IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eme/sefpps/v24y2007i1p72-90.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why UK companies hedge interest rate risk

Author

Listed:
  • Alpa Dhanani
  • Suzanne Fifield
  • Christine Helliar
  • Lorna Stevenson

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the interest rate risk management (IRRM) practices of UK companies. In particular, the study examines five theories that have been advanced in the literature to explain why companies hedge: tax and regulatory arbitrage; under-investment, volatility of earnings and future planning; financial distress; managerial self-interest; and economies of scale. Design/methodology/approach - The paper uses a questionnaire survey to examine the importance of hedging theories and to look at the detailed risk management practices of companies. Findings - The research findings confirm that all five theories of financial risk management have some support in practice. However, while the responses to some questions supported the theories, other information elicited from the questionnaires did not. This finding demonstrates that studies which employ large disaggregated datasets that result in generalised conclusions often miss the dynamic nature of corporate affairs and that, as such, more qualitative research is needed in this area. Originality/value - The use of a questionnaire survey facilitates an investigation of the IRRM practices of companies on an individual basis rather than the aggregated analysis afforded by most quantitative studies in finance. In addition, the qualitative approach adopted here permits an examination of many factors that relate to risk management practices, rather than just a limited number of financial ratios or factors that are typically used in studies of large datasets.

Suggested Citation

  • Alpa Dhanani & Suzanne Fifield & Christine Helliar & Lorna Stevenson, 2007. "Why UK companies hedge interest rate risk," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 72-90, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:sefpps:v:24:y:2007:i:1:p:72-90
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/10.1108/10867370710737391?utm_campaign=RePEc&WT.mc_id=RePEc
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joshua Abor & Nicholas Biekpe, 2005. "What Determines the Capital Structure of Listed Firms in Ghana?," The African Finance Journal, Africagrowth Institute, vol. 7(1), pages 37-48.
    2. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1043-1075, October.
    3. Berger, Philip G & Ofek, Eli & Yermack, David L, 1997. " Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1411-1438, September.
    4. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    5. Julio Pindado & Chabela De La Torre, 2011. "Capital Structure: New Evidence from the Ownership Structure," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 11(2), pages 213-226, June.
    6. Kim, Wi Saeng & Sorensen, Eric H., 1986. "Evidence on the Impact of the Agency Costs of Debt on Corporate Debt Policy," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(02), pages 131-144, June.
    7. Fernando Lefort & Eduardo Walker, 2000. "Ownership And Capital Structure Of Chilean Conglomerates:Facts And Hypotheses For Governance," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 3(1), pages 3-27.
    8. Nigel Driffield & Vidya Mahambare & Sarmistha Pal, 2005. "How Ownership Structure Affects Capital Structure and Firm Performance? Recent Evidence from East Asia," Finance 0509028, EconWPA.
    9. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial Entrenchment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1197-1215.
    10. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December.
    11. Anderson, Ronald C. & Mansi, Sattar A. & Reeb, David M., 2004. "Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 315-342.
    12. Anthony Kyereboah-coleman & Nicholas Biekpe, 2006. "Corporate Governance And Financing Choices Of Firms: A Panel Data Analysis," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 74(4), pages 670-681, December.
    13. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    14. Agyenim Boateng, 2004. "Determinants of capital structure: Evidence from international joint ventures in Ghana," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 31(1/2), pages 56-66, January.
    15. Mehran, Hamid, 1992. "Executive Incentive Plans, Corporate Control, and Capital Structure," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(04), pages 539-560, December.
    16. Vitaliy Zheka, 2005. "Corporate governance, ownership structure and corporate efficiency: the case of Ukraine," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(7), pages 451-460.
    17. Bajaj, Mukesh & Chan, Yuk-Shee & Dasgupta, Sudipto, 1998. "The Relationship between Ownership, Financing Decisions and Firm Performance: A Signaling Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(3), pages 723-744, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:sefpps:v:24:y:2007:i:1:p:72-90. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Virginia Chapman). General contact details of provider: http://www.emeraldinsight.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.