Does mandatory CSR expenditure regulation matter to promoters? Empirical evidence from India

Purpose - This paper aims to examine the relation between promoter ownership (PO) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) expenditure in India, the first country to legally mandate the CSR spending. Design/methodology/approach - This paper applies panel regression to examine the impact of PO on actual and excess CSR expenditure because panel regression has lesser multicollinearity problems and has the benefit of controlling for individual or time heterogeneity mostly present in cross-section or time series data. The results are robust to testing the CSR expenditure decision (to engage or not to engage in CSR) by using the binary choice logit model. Findings - Based on the agency theory, this study shows a nonlinear relation between PO and CSR expenditure, which suggests that promoters start extracting private benefits of control at the expense of outside shareholders and engage in lesser CSR expenditure only when their ownership crosses a threshold level of 52% approximately. This study further shows that the nonlinear relation between PO and CSR expenditure is more pronounced for firms that are more prone to agency problems, for business group firms than standalone firms and for firms not following the Companies Act 2013 CSR mandate. Practical implications - The findings shed light at the idea of how promoters’ incentive alignment should be proposed and followed to encourage a firm’s social investment activities. Originality/value - First, this study argues that the relation between PO and CSR expenditure is nonlinear in nature, by showing that the impact of PO on CSR expenditure is adverse only at higher level of PO. Second, this study’s richer data set on CSR expenditure not only allows the authors to analyze the relation for actual CSR spending by the firms but also helps to examine the excess spending made over and above the mandatory spending, as directed by the Companies Act, 2013.