Taxes and risk-taking behavior: evidence from mergers and acquisitions in the G7 nations

Purpose - This study aims to examine how corporate taxes affect corporate risk-taking decisions. Design/methodology/approach - This study examines corporate risk-taking by analyzing how a firm’s asset risk changes following an acquisition carried out by publicly listed companies in the G7 nations. To measure the asset risk of a firm, this study uses the option pricing framework in Merton (1974). Findings - Consistent with an implication of the Merton (1974) framework, the findings show that firms take more risk in their investment decisions when tax rates are high. Moreover, the tax effects wane for firms with a relatively large borrowing opportunity and this suggests that the risk-taking incentive from taxes is moderated by the reputation concern in the debt market, lending support to the Diamond (1989) reputation-building model. The empirical results also show that the tax-induced risk-taking incentive is restrained by creditor rights. Overall, the study reveals an important role of taxes in the structure of corporate investment decisions. Practical implications - The implications of this study can be beneficial to policymakers when considering the alteration of tax rates, as it will affect the riskiness of firm investment decisions. Originality/value - This study provides a better understanding of the role of taxes on risk-taking and also contributes to the growing body of evidence supporting tax effects of risk-taking. The relationship between taxes and risk-taking has proven that the corporate taxation is one of the key factors that firms consider during their selection of risky investments. Unlike previous studies, this research is the first to investigate the change in asset risk, estimating by the option pricing framework, through studying a particular event: mergers and acquisitions.