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Brokers' incentives and conflicts of interest in the control of opportunism

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  • Tajudeen Olalekan Yusuf

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine brokers' financial incentives in the Nigerian insurance market and how they balance conflict of interest which their role engenders. The paper aims to assess how these affect the control of opportunism of customers in the Nigerian insurance market. Design/methodology/approach - The study involved the use of semi‐structured interviews of insurance broking executives and documentary analyses of how incentives aid the control of opportunism in the insurance market. Findings - Findings suggest that the Nigerian insurance market operates on highly tariff incentive system which might be hampering insurance brokers' role in bridging information asymmetries to control opportunism in the market. Conflicts of interest are also real in the insurance market. Practical implications - Findings are relevant for practitioners and regulators in addressing the restrictive remuneration system which calls for liberalisation to encourage the control of opportunism in the insurance market. Originality/value - The study underscores how financial incentives might be utilised to balance conflict of interest which insurance intermediation engenders.

Suggested Citation

  • Tajudeen Olalekan Yusuf, 2011. "Brokers' incentives and conflicts of interest in the control of opportunism," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 12(3), pages 168-181, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:jrfpps:15265941111136923
    DOI: 10.1108/15265941111136923
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