Institutions and economic volatility: democracy versus risk of expropriation
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to decompose the effects of democracy and risk of expropriation on economic volatility. Design/methodology/approach - The authors follow Acemouglu Findings - The authors present empirical evidence that the economic performance of more centralized former European colonies is not more volatile than that of democratic ones, once the exogenous variation of expropriation risk across countries is included in the model Originality/value - The paper investigates the role of a spectrum of different institutions on economic stability. In this sense, the paper contributes to the literature analyzing the effect of property-rights protection, as measured by a risk-of-expropriation index, on the relation between democracy and economic stability.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 36 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.emeraldinsight.com|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Emerald Group Publishing, Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley, BD16 1WA, UK|
Web: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/jes.htm Email:
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:jespps:v:36:y:2009:i:2:p:184-194. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Virginia Chapman)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.