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Endogenous evolution of patriarchal clan system in ancient China

Author

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  • Feng Deng

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analyze long-term institutional causes and consequences of preference falsification by studying the evolution of China’s patriarchal clan system. Design/methodology/approach - The historic study shows that although the clan system was abolished in the Qin dynasty, it re-emerged among high-standing families in the Han dynasty and spread to common people after the Tang dynasty. Findings - The author submits that the clan system was an institutional response to the preference falsification problem that arose due to the dictatorial political institutions first established in the Qin dynasty. It helped people to take collective action by themselves and also opened a back door to influence government decisions. A piece of clear evidence is the co-evolution of the clan system and government personnel system. Social implications - In this sense, the clan system probably also helped to prolong the political institutions for 2,000 years. Originality/value - This is the first institutional study on the clan system in China.

Suggested Citation

  • Feng Deng, 2017. "Endogenous evolution of patriarchal clan system in ancient China," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 44(10), pages 1322-1334, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:ijsepp:ijse-12-2015-0330
    DOI: 10.1108/IJSE-12-2015-0330
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    China; Trust; Clan; Hierarchical preferences; Preference falsification; D71; H41; P40;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • P40 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - General

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