Agency conflicts, product market competition and investment efficiency: new evidence from emerging market

Purpose - This study examines the influence of product market competition on investment inefficiency of Indian firms in context of agency problems. Additionally, this study also investigates whether intense competition is a substitute for or complementary to corporate governance in reducing investment inefficiency of firms. Design/methodology/approach - Utilizing the residuals extracted from Biddleet al.(2009) investment model, investment inefficiency, overinvestment and underinvestment are measured for 506 non-financial Indian listed firms with 6,998 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2022. Product market competition is measured using various proxies such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, top-four firm concentration ratio, total number of firms in industry, industry market size, weighted average of entry costs and research and development (R&D) to sales ratio. Firms' internal governance is measured using a newly corporate governance index developed with 65 new governance stipulations. Several pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regressions were estimated involving investment inefficiency of firms, product market competition, governance index and firm-specific variables. Endogeneity issues were addressed through two-stage least squares. Robustness checks were also conducted using a two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM). Findings - The main finding of the study indicates that heightened product market competition reduces investment inefficiency, overinvestment and underinvestment among the selected Indian firms suggesting that firms facing intense competition are less prone to invest below or above optimal levels. This is primarily because in highly competitive industries, managers face greater liquidation risks, prompting more efficient capital investment decisions. The results also indicate that robust corporate governance significantly mitigates investment inefficiencies in non-competitive industries compared to competitive ones suggesting heightened competition reduces managerial slack, resulting in diminished benefits from good governance in competitive settings. Overall results indicate a substitution effect between corporate governance and competition in reducing investment inefficiency, with robustness across various empirical specifications, industry classifications and alternative competition and inefficiency measures. Practical implications - The evidence from this work emphasizes the pivotal roles of market competitiveness and corporate governance in shaping investment efficiency. Regulators must closely monitor monopolistic behaviors to safeguard stakeholder interests, enhance investment efficiency and foster value creation. Recognizing the positive impact of market competition, firms should prioritize initiatives to promote industrial openness and intensify competition while strengthening market mechanisms. Policymakers should consider implementing competition-centric governance policies, such as deregulation and antitrust laws, to stimulate market competition. These measures can mitigate governance-related costs and promote a competitive marketplace. Originality/value - This study provides fresh evidence concerning the effects of product market competition on investment efficiency of Indian firms under new governance norms, an unexplored area in India as most of the existing work has primarily examined the association between competition and investment levels. To best of our knowledge, this is one of the earliest studies demonstrating the substitution effects of competitiveness and governance systems on lowering investment inefficiency suggesting a significant influence of corporate governance in non-competitive industries. Finally, this study contributes to the field of methodology by developing a new firm-specific governance index based on 65 governance indicators.