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Does PAPI monitoring improve local governance? Evidence from a natural experiment in Vietnam

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  • Long Giang
  • Cuong Nguyen
  • Anh Tran

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of monitoring local authorities on the quality of governance and public services reported by citizens in Vietnam, using the Vietnam Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) surveys. Design/methodology/approach - PAPI randomly selected 200 locations in 93 districts of 30 provinces to conduct its survey in 2010, and subsequently rolled out the survey nationally in 2011 and 2012. Using 2011 and 2012 survey data, the authors compare the quality of governance and public services reported in provinces and districts that were covered in the 2011 PAPI survey with those that were not surveyed in 2010. Theories suggest that local authorities may improve their behavior if they have been surveyed and are, thus, aware that they are being monitored, leading to higher quality governance. Findings - In this paper, the authors find that governance quality reported in later years by citizens in the surveyed provinces and districts of the 2010 PAPI survey was significantly higher than the quality reported by citizens in locations that were not surveyed in 2010. Monitoring appears to improve a wide range of governance aspects, including local participation in village decisions, transparency of local decision-making, accountability, administrative procedures and public service delivery. Originality/value - The main innovation of this study is to use a randomized survey on governance as a natural experiment to measure the impact of monitoring on the quality of governance and public services, as reported by citizens.

Suggested Citation

  • Long Giang & Cuong Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2017. "Does PAPI monitoring improve local governance? Evidence from a natural experiment in Vietnam," International Journal of Development Issues, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 16(1), pages 85-106, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:ijdipp:ijdi-05-2016-0028
    DOI: 10.1108/IJDI-05-2016-0028
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    Cited by:

    1. Tran, Tuyen Quang & Thi Nguyen, Hoai Thu & Hoang, Quang Ngoc & Van Nguyen, Dinh, 2022. "The influence of contextual and household factors on multidimensional poverty in rural Vietnam: A multilevel regression analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 390-403.
    2. Nguyen, Cuong Viet, 2021. "Last corrupt deed before retirement? Evidence from a lower middle-income country," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vietnam; Public administration; Governance quality; Governance supervision; PAPI; H1; H70; G38;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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