Diseño de tarifas en empresas reguladas: una nueva axiomatización del sistema de Aumann-Shapley
This paper presents an analysis of tariffs for social monopolies. We show that the Aumann-Shapley mechanism is the unique satisfying a set of axioms yielding neutral tariffs. We obtain this mechanism by means of an additive extension of the marginal cost pricing rule. This way to derive our rule permits us to have new economic interpretations about what the Aumann-Shapley advice is and to connect it with the results by Ramsey and Boiteux.
Volume (Year): V (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (January-June)
|Contact details of provider:|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:emc:ecomex:v:5:y:1996:i:1:p:77-95. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ricardo Tiscareño)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.