Political Competition and Bureaucratic Employment: A Formal Analysis of the Inefficiency in the Provision of Public Goods
This paper presents a formal model to explore the effect of political competition on government performance relative to the efficient provision of public goods and the size of bureaucracy. In contrast with other arguments that sustain there is a positive relationship between political competition and efficiency, the main result shows that political competition provides incentives for an excess of bureaucratic employment and an inefficient provision of public goods.
Volume (Year): XXI (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (July-December)
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