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Political Competition and Bureaucratic Employment: A Formal Analysis of the Inefficiency in the Provision of Public Goods

Listed author(s):
  • Leonardo A. Gatica Arreola


    (Profesor-investigador, Departamento de Economía e Instituto de Investigación de Políticas Públicas, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico Administrativas (CUCEA), Universidad de Guadalajara. Zapopan, Jal. Mexico.)

  • Georgina Soto Sotomayor


    (Asesora económica, Comisión de Desarrollo Rural, H. Cámara de Diputados. México, D.F. Mexico.)

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    This paper presents a formal model to explore the effect of political competition on government performance relative to the efficient provision of public goods and the size of bureaucracy. In contrast with other arguments that sustain there is a positive relationship between political competition and efficiency, the main result shows that political competition provides incentives for an excess of bureaucratic employment and an inefficient provision of public goods.

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    Article provided by in its journal Economia Mexicana NUEVA EPOCA.

    Volume (Year): XXI (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 (July-December)
    Pages: 351-372

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    Handle: RePEc:emc:ecomex:v:21:y:2012:i:2:p:351-372
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