Merger Policy and Efficiency Gains
This paper provides a discussion on mergers and the role played by efficiency gains. By introducing a capacity-constrained Cournot model, we show that one way to extract useful information from merging firms is to design a scheme (requiring that the firms divest some of their assets) that leads to self-selection of the more socially worthwhile mergers.
Volume (Year): XIX (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (July-December)
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