Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist: Corrigendum
In this paper we make a new analysis of the model presented in Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984). They propose a model in discrete time, such that at each period a new cohort of agents enters the market –each cohort is composed by two types of agents, high value and low value agents– and a monopolist offering a durable good. They argue that in this model the monopolist charge a cyclic price path as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Instead of this, we show that either the monopolist charge a single price forever as a subgame perfect equilibrium or a subgame perfect equilibrium does not exist.
Volume (Year): XI (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (July-December)
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