Mixed duopoly with wage-rise contract as strategic commitment
This paper examines a quantity-setting mixed market model in which both a social-welfare-maximizing public firm and a profit-maximizing private firm can adopt wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that the equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg solution where the public firm is the leader.
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Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (Summer)
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