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Mixed duopoly with wage-rise contract as strategic commitment


  • Kazuhiro Ohnishi

    (Osaka University and Institute for Basic Economic Science, Japan)


This paper examines a quantity-setting mixed market model in which both a social-welfare-maximizing public firm and a profit-maximizing private firm can adopt wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that the equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg solution where the public firm is the leader.

Suggested Citation

  • Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2008. "Mixed duopoly with wage-rise contract as strategic commitment," Ekonomia, Cyprus Economic Society and University of Cyprus, vol. 11(1), pages 35-49, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:ekn:ekonom:v:11:y:2008:i:1:p:35-49

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets


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