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Ownership structure and efficiency: an analysis with the Theory of Incentives

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  • Paulo Augusto P. de Britto

Abstract

This article discusses the influence of the ownership structure over the efficiency.The framework used is the incentive theory, in which the principal must build an incentivescheme, which induces an agent to act optimally. First, we verify the reasons for publicintervention in industries with market failure. Following, we study the deterioration of theincentive structure over managers as a result of the ownership change. So, we verify how thestructure of incentives can be restored with the firm’s privatization, with the maintenance,by the government, of some control over the firm. Finally, we make a brief exposition aboutthe regulatory instruments. JEL Classification: D42; D43; D12; L13.

Suggested Citation

  • Paulo Augusto P. de Britto, 1999. "Ownership structure and efficiency: an analysis with the Theory of Incentives," Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Center of Political Economy, vol. 19(3), pages 460-469.
  • Handle: RePEc:ekm:repojs:v:19:y:1999:i:3:p:460-469:id:1064
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    Keywords

    Privatization; theory of incentives; principal-agent model; market failures; property;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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